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Abstract—The scheme of application (app) distribution systems
involving incentivized third-party app vendors is a desirable
option for the emerging edge computing systems. However, such
a scheme also brings various security challenges as faced by
the current mobile app distribution systems. In this paper, we
study a threat named covert device association, in which the
vendors of two apps collude to figure out which of their app
installations run on the same edge device. If the two colluding
apps are popular, the threat can be used to launch various
types of further attacks at scale. For example, the user of the
compromised edge device, who wishes to remain anonymous to
one of the two apps, will be de-anonymized if the user is not
anonymous to the other app. Moreover, the coalition of the two
apps will have an escalated privilege set that is the union of
their individual privilege sets. In this paper, we implement the
threat by a reliable and ubiquitous covert channel based on
the edge device’s processor workload. The implementations on
three edge devices (two smartphones and an embedded compute
board) running Android and Android Things do not require any
privileged permissions. Our implementations cover three attack
scenarios of 1) two apps running on the same Android phone, 2)
an app and a web session in the Tor browser running on the same
Android phone, and 3) two apps running on the same Android
Things device. Experiments show that the covert channel gives
at least 0.25 bps data rate and the covert device association takes
at most 3.2 minutes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has been fast expanding its edge to interconnect
a wide spectrum of smart devices (e.g., embedded sensors,
smartphones, wearables, and home appliances) and form the
Internet of Things (IoT). It is estimated that, by 2019, there
are about 26.66 billion IoT devices [1]. This quantity is
predicted to be doubled by 2022 [2]. The IoT devices can
be roughly categorized into two classes of end devices and
edge devices. An end device is often a smart version of a
traditional special-purpose physical object. As the end devices
do not provide generic computing services, their computing
units are often customized by the manufacturers. Various smart
home appliances are representative examples, such as smart
lights, toothbrushes, body scales, etc. Differently, edge devices
often provide some form of generic computing services and
can serve as the intermediaries between the end devices and
the cloud backend. Examples include smartphones (as mobile
edges), set-top boxes, and home gateways.
The current prevalent mobile operating systems (OSes), e.g.,
Android and iOS, have fostered thriving application (app)
distribution systems involving large communities of third-
party app vendors and users. Such an app-centric model is
Fig. 1: Covert device association among colluding apps on
mobile or edge OSes (e.g., Android and Android Things).
being adopted by emerging OSes that target a broader scope
of edge devices, such as Ubuntu IoT, Windows IoT, and
Android Things. Different from end devices that mostly run
device manufacturers’ firmwares only, edge devices face a
unique challenge of security risks brought by the admission
of third-party apps. Although the mobile OS security has
received extensive research attention [3]–[5] and the security
of prevalent mobile OSes has been continually hardened, the
attack-defense race will continue and the emerging edge OSes
may not be incorporated with the latest security enhancements
that have been adopted by the mobile OSes.
The mobile and edge OSes mostly allow the user to
run multiple apps concurrently. The communications among
different apps should be performed over the overt channels.
For instance, in Android, the inter-app interactions should be
implemented using Android APIs such that the Android OS
can monitor such communications [6] and keep the user’s
awareness if needed. The covert communications among apps
that the OS is unaware of will present a serious threat on
the user’s security and privacy [7]. In this paper, we study
a minimal form of inter-app covert communication called
covert device association, which is illustrated by Fig. 1.
Specifically, the vendors of two apps collude stealthily. Any
two installations of their apps, referred to as x and y, can
determine whether they run on the same device. If yes, they are
2associated and can exchange massive data over the wideband
Internet channel consisting of x’s and y’s connections to their
cloud backends as well as the communication channel between
the two colluding vendors.
The covert device association capability is a stepping stone
for a number of further attacks that can be launched by the
associated x and y, including but not limited to the following:
De-anonymization: If the user provides a meaningful identity
(e.g., e-mail address or phone number) to x, the y, to which the
user wishes to keep anonymous, can obtain the user’s identity
from the vendor of x over the Internet channel. Particularly,
in this paper, we will show that the y can be a web session
running in a mobile Tor browser [8] for anonymity and it can
establish the covert association with a local app x.
Privilege escalation: Current mobile OSes feature meticu-
lously designed permission control mechanisms to manage
the information that can be accessed by individual apps.
Edge OSes will likely adopt similar designs for edge security.
However, through the Internet channel, the associated x and
y can access the information that is defined by the union of
x’s and y’s permission sets. Therefore, the privileges of both
x and y are stealthily escalated beyond the awareness of the
victim edge OS.
The above follow-up attacks launched based on the covert
device association can occur at large scales when the two
apps are installed on many edge devices. Therefore, the covert
device association can be a widespread threat should the edge
OSes and the corresponding app distribution systems prevail.
In this paper, we investigate the covert device association
via the edge processor workload. Existing studies [9]–[12]
have shown the feasibility of various covert channels via
touchscreen brightness, vibration actuation and sensing, and
etc., on mobile OSes. However, they focus on the local data
exchange collusion between two apps that may require non-
trivial synchronization mechanisms. Moreover, some covert
channels (e.g., touchscreen) are not ubiquitous on a wider
spectrum of edge platforms. Therefore, although the local
data exchange collusion via the identified covert channels
has been shown feasible, they are inefficient and may not
be always available. Differently, in this paper, we show via
extensive experiments that the processor workload provides a
reliable covert channel that is ubiquitous on edge hardware
platforms. Moreover, the studied covert device association
requires a simple synchronization mechanism (i.e., scheduled
rendezvous) and minimizes the usage of the covert channel by
moving the data exchange collusion to the cloud backends. In
summary, the high availability, the simple synchronization, and
the minimal usage of the processor workload covert channel
make the covert device association a credible and immediate
security threat against the emerging edge computing systems.
In this paper, we present the prototype implementations of
the covert device association via processor workload in three
configurations: (i) two local apps on Android smartphone;
(ii) a local app and a web session in a Tor browser [8] on
Android smartphone; and (iii) two local apps on a Raspberry
Pi single-board computer running Android Things OS 1.0 [13].
The implementations exploit several synthetic files that store
information relevant to the processor’s utilized cycles and the
dynamic voltage and frequency scaling (DVFS). The accesses
to these files do not require privileged permissions. We also
present the results of evaluating the implementations including
the impact of interfering computing tasks on the covert channel
and smartphone’s heat generation caused by the modulation of
bits using processor workload. Results show that, the processor
workload-based covert channel gives at least 0.25 bps data rate
with zero empirical bit error rate and maintains the smartphone
temperature below human body temperature. With the 0.25 bps
data rate, the covert device association can be completed
within 3.2 minutes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews related work. Section III overviews the covert
device association threat. Section IV presents prototype imple-
mentations. Section V presents evaluation results. Section VI
discusses countermeasures. Section VII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Device fingerprinting and covert channel are two topics
related to the device association threat studied in this paper.
This section reviews the related work in these two topics.
Device fingerprinting uses device-unique metrics to identify
and track devices. In [14], the accelerometer measurements of
a smartphone are used to construct a hardware fingerprint. The
study shows that the entropy of the fingerprint is sufficient to
uniquely identify a device among thousands of devices with a
low probability of collision.
In [15], smartphones’ microphones and speakers are shown
to provide hardware fingerprints.
The study [16] shows that a picture captured by a smart-
phone camera contains the camera’s fingerprint. Most of
such fingerprinting techniques are developed for sensor-rich
smartphones. The wider spectrum of edge devices may not
be equipped with the used sensors. Moreover, when such
fingerprinting techniques are used for device association, the
two colluding apps x and y need to access the same fingerprint
bearing sensors. The fingerprint extraction and match pro-
cesses often incur considerable compute overhead. In contrast,
the covert device association technique in this paper uses
the processors that are pervasively available on any edge
devices. The process of demodulating the processor workload
to information bits involves light computation only.
A covert channel is a communication channel that is not
by design and not managed by the OS. The covert channel
between two processes running on the same device is often
based on a shared resource. Memory access-based covert
channels between two virtual machines in the cloud computing
environment have been studied [17]–[19]. On mobile devices,
hardware accesses (e.g., Bluetooth, vibrator and accelerometer,
screen brightness) have been exploited to establish covert
channels [9]–[12]. However, the used hardware components
(e.g., vibrator, accelerometer, screen, etc) are not ubiquitously
available on a wider spectrum of edge devices. Moreover, the
accesses to the hardware components generally require certain
permission.
Several studies exploit processors to establish covert chan-
nels [9], [10], [20], [21]. In [20], [21], the heat transfers
3between two cores on a server-class processor are used for the
covert communications between two virtual machines running
on the two cores. As virtualization is not widely adopted on
edge devices, our approach uses the processor-wide workload
as the medium of covert communications and does not resort
to heat. This improves the efficiency of the covert channel
and helps avoid high device temperatures that undermine the
stealthiness of the attack on hand-held devices. The studies [9],
[10] mention the use of mobile processor utilization among
various media for covert communications. However, these
studies [9], [10], [20], [21] focus on covert communications
only that require non-trivial synchronization mechanisms and
fall short of addressing realistic factors such as interfering
computing tasks. Differently, we focus on covert device as-
sociation, a minimal form of inter-app covert communication
that presents immediate threats to the edge computing systems,
and perform evaluation under realistic settings.
The covert channel between two apps running on different
devices is based on some physical signal that can propagate
in space, e.g., sound [22], heat [23], and electromagnetic ra-
diation [24]. As smartphones’ audio sub-system (loudspeaker
and microphone) can work in a near-ultrasonic frequency band
that cannot be perceived by human ears, ultrasound-based
cross-device covert channel has been designed [22]. Such
channel can be exploited to track users and infer users’ privacy.
The study [25] found 234 Android apps that are constantly
detecting ultrasonic beacons emitted from devices installed
by mall stores to reveal the smartphone owners’ shopping
behaviors.
The ultrasound-based covert channel among personal com-
pute devices (e.g., smartphones, wearables, and tablets) and
home appliances (e.g., smart TVs and cars) can also be used
for user desire/preference analysis and targeted advertisement
[26].
III. OVERVIEW OF COVERT DEVICE ASSOCIATION
This section presents an overview of the covert device
association between two colluding apps. Section III-A presents
the threat model. Section III-B discusses three attack scenar-
ios. Section III-C presents the modulation and demodulation
schemes using edge processor workload.
A. Threat Model
We consider two app vendors that collude to perform covert
device association. Let X and Y denote the apps published by
the two vendors, respectively; let X and Y denote the finite
sets of X’s and Y ’s installations on the Internet-connected
edge devices, respectively. The covert device association deter-
mines whether any two installations x ∈ X and y ∈ Y are on
the same edge device. While this paper focuses on presenting
the threat with two colluding app vendors, the attack tactic
can be easily extended to address the case where more than
two app vendors collude, which will be discussed at the end
of this section.
If the apps can obtain the edge devices’ unique identifiers
(IDs), the covert device association is straightforward. How-
ever, as devices’ unique IDs have strong security and privacy
implications, they should be only accessible via overt mech-
anisms managed by the OSes. The latest mobile OSes have
implemented various restriction and protection mechanisms for
mobile edge devices’ unique IDs. For instance, Android 10
only allows the device/profile owner apps that have certain
privileged permissions (i.e., the special carrier permission or
the read privileged phone state) to access the non-resettable
IDs such as International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI)
and serial number. Android 10 returns randomized media
access control (MAC) addresses to all apps that are not device
owner apps. Thus, obtaining the edge devices’ unique IDs
does not form a covert mechanism for device association and
will become unreliable through the course of the edge OSes’
security enhancements.
In this paper, the basic idea is that the app installation x,
performing as the transmitter, influences the edge device’s pro-
cessor workload to modulate x’s installation ID that is denoted
by I(x) and unique within X , while the app installation y,
performing as the receiver, reads the processor workload to
detect and demodulate the app installation ID. Fig. 1 illustrates
the process. If the receiver y can detect an app installation ID,
it sends its own app installation ID I(y) and the detected ID
to the vendor Y . As X colludes with Y and knows all the
app installation IDs of X , the colluding vendors can figure
out the X’s installation instance within X that has the detected
installation ID. Thus, the covert device association is achieved.
We discuss several issues related to the implementation of
the above threat.
a) App installation ID generation: As the colluding
vendors identify the app installations based on both the app
name (i.e., X or Y ) and the installation ID, each vendor can
manage its own installation ID database independently. That is,
the IDs of the installations in X or Y are unique, while x ∈ X
and y ∈ Y may have the identical installation ID. We follow
the rationale of IPv6 to use six bytes (i.e., 48 bits) to represent
installation ID. The adversary vendor can also use fewer bits
based on the estimated quantity of the installations of its app to
reduce the covert communication overhead. For instance, from
a statistics of Google Play as of September 2019 [27], 4-byte
app installation ID can be adopted for 99.986% apps that have
less than one billion installations, among a total of 281,427
apps. When an app installation is initialized for the first-time
use on an edge device, it communicates with the respective
vendor’s cloud backend to request an unique installation ID.
The cloud backend can generate unique IDs sequentially or
randomly. The app installation stores the received ID to the
local storage for future use.
b) Synchronization mechanism: The threat can adopt a
scheduled rendezvous scheme for the synchronization between
the transmitter and the receiver. Specifically, the colluding
vendors stipulate periodic time instants for the covert com-
munications, e.g., 04:00:00.000am of every Monday. When
the apps can access the local time, the rendezvouses can be
scheduled at the time instants when the edge devices are likely
idle to reduce the impact of the interfering compute tasks
on the processor workload-based covert communications, e.g.,
during the sleep time of the mobile devices’ users.
4c) More than two vendors collude: In a coalition of more
than two colluding vendors, each vendor’s app can take turn
to be the transmitter at the stipulated time instants, whereas
all other vendors’ apps act as the receivers. As a result, the
coalition can figure out the subset of the apps running on each
individual edge device.
B. Attack Scenarios
This section discusses three possible scenarios of the covert
device association attack. Their prototype implementations in
the Android OS and Android Things OS [13] will be presented
and evaluated in Section IV and Section V, respectively.
1) Covert device association between two mobile apps: In
this scenario, the two apps x and y are native apps running
on top of a mobile OS. The transmitter app x modulates
its installation ID by affecting the processor workload. The
receiver app y detects and demodulates the installation ID by
monitoring the processor workload. In Section IV, we will
implement this scenario based on the Android OS. We will
elaborate the detailed constraints imposed by the Android OS
for the receiver y to access the processor workload and our
approach to overcome the constraints.
2) Covert device association between a mobile app and a
web session: In this scenario, a JavaScript-instrumented web
page running in a web browser on top of a mobile OS is the
transmitter x and a native app running in the mobile OS is
the receiver y. The web session ID of x can be generated
by the remote web server dynamically when the web browser
requests the web page. Section IV will present the technical
details of using JavaScript to affect the processor workload
and modulate the web session ID. The web browser can
be a Tor browser [8] that integrates the Tor for anonymous
communications over an overlay network and various modifi-
cations for enhanced anonymity. The user wishes to achieve
guaranteed anonymity by using the Tor browser. Unfortunately,
if the user is not anonymous to y, through the covert device
association, the anonymity protection provided by the Tor
browser will be breached since the colluding vendors that
provide the JavaScript-instrumented web page and the app
y, respectively, can associate the user’s identity (e.g., e-mail
address) provided to y with the anonymous web session x or
the user’s pseudonym provided to x.
3) Covert device association between two edge apps:
We extend the first scenario to address the case with two
native apps running in an edge OS. We envisage that indoor
appliances will increasingly adopt edge OSes that can run mul-
tiple apps concurrently. Many smart appliances have adopted
customized Android OSes, such as TVs, fridges, and washers.
The recently released Android Things [13] is a lightweight
edge OS that caters better into low-power and resource-
constrained edge devices. The prototype implementation of the
covert device association on Android Things will suggest the
credibility of the attack on a wide spectrum of edge devices.
C. Modulation/Demodulation using Processor Workload
This section presents the processor workload-based mod-
ulation and demodulation methods. As we will discuss in
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Fig. 2: Ideal processor workload waveforms of ASK and FSK.
Section IV, the processor time load and processor frequency
load are two metrics characterizing the processor workload.
The modulation and demodulation methods presented in this
section are agnostic to the detailed processor workload metrics.
1) Modulation: Unipolar non-return-to-zero (NRZ) line
code is used to encode the app installation ID. For modu-
lation, we consider the amplitude-shift keying (ASK) and the
frequency-shift keying (FSK), which are two basic band-pass
modulation schemes widely used in digital communication
systems. We will compare the performance of the ASK-
based and FSK-based covert communications via extensive
evaluation, in the presence of interfering compute tasks. We
do not use the phase-shift keying (PSK) because it is hard to
control the phase of the carrier (i.e., the processor workload)
in the presence of interfering workload.
Fig. 2 illustrates the ideal processor workload waveforms of
ASK and FSK. Under ASK, a high processor workload repre-
sents binary 1, whereas a low processor workload represents
binary 0. The two binaries use the identical bit duration that
is denoted by T in seconds. Our evaluation will vary the bit
duration to achieve various data rates in bit per second (bps)
and assess the resulted bit error rates (BERs).
Under FSK, the two binaries also use the identical bit
duration T . The processor workload following a square wave
with a period of T seconds represents binary 0, whereas that
following a square wave with a period of T
5
seconds represents
binary 1. Thus, the carrier frequency for binary 1 is five times
of the carrier frequency for binary 0. The frequencies are
chosen to achieve well separation of the two states.
2) Demodulation: The receiver samples the processor
workload to demodulate the signal. From the Nyquist sampling
theorem, the sampling rate should be at least twice of the
highest frequency of the carrier. We adopt an overprovisioned
sampling rate of four times of the highest frequency of the
carrier. Therefore, the sampling rates for the ASK and FSK
schemes are 4
T
Hz and 20
T
Hz, respectively.
Note that as the transmitter and the receiver are synchro-
nized by the scheduled rendezvous mechanism, the demodu-
lation can be coherent.
We use threshold-based bit detection. Specifically, for ASK,
if 75% of the sampled data points are higher than a detection
threshold, the bit is detected as 1; otherwise, it is detected
as 0. We use the average of the full processor workload and
the baseline processor workload before the transmission of the
installation ID as the detection threshold.
For FSK, we first perform the fast Fourier transform (FFT)
on the sampled data over the current bit duration to generate
5the power spectrum density (PSD). If the peak value of the
PSD occurs at a frequency higher than 3
T
Hz, the bit is detected
as 1; otherwise, it is detected as 0. Note that the used frequency
threshold of 3
T
Hz is the mid point between the two carrier
frequencies of 1
T
Hz and 5
T
Hz respectively representing binary
0 and 1.
IV. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATIONS
This section presents the prototype implementations of the
three attack scenarios discussed in Section III-B. First, we
present the device setup in Section IV-A. Then, we present the
processor workload metrics in Section IV-B. Lastly, we present
the implementation details of processor workload control and
sensing in Section IV-C.
A. Device Setup
Our implementations use three representative edge devices:
1) The edge device named Phone-A is a Xiaomi Redmi 2
smartphone equipped with a 1.2GHz ARM Cortex-A53
quad-core processor that can run at eight different clock
rates from 200MHz to 1.2GHz. Note that the run-time
clock rate can be used to infer the processor workload, as
discussed in Section IV-B. The smartphone runs Android
OS 5.1.1. It represents a low-cost smartphone according
to the market retail price.
2) The edge device named Phone-B is a Moto Z XT1650-
03 smartphone that features ARM’s big.LITTLE archi-
tecture consisting of two processors (a 1.8GHz dual-
core Kryo processor and a 1.6GHz dual-core Kryo
processor). It automatically switches between the two
processors depending on run-time compute load. Such
switching presents a challenge to the workload modula-
tion and demodulation. The 1.8GHz processor can run at
21 different clock rates from 307MHz to 1.8GHz, while
the 1.6GHz processor can run at 16 different clock rates
from 307MHz to 1.6GHz. The phone runs Android 8.0.0
and represents a relatively high-end smartphone.
3) The edge device named RPi is a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B single-board computer equipped with a 1.2GHz quad-
core ARM8 processor. The processor can run at two
different clock rates only, i.e., 600MHz and 1.2GHz. It
runs Android Things 1.0.0.
Our prototype implementations focus on Android OS, which
has been widely adopted on smartphones and home appliances.
The Android Things OS is a lightweight Android optimized
for embedded devices. To be suitable for the devices without
any user interface, the Android Things apps and their runtime
permissions are deployed through over-the-air updates via a
console. Multiple apps can be launched by the Android Things
OS via a broadcast intent (BOOT COMPLETED) and run
concurrently in the background.
B. Processor Workload Metrics
In this paper, we adopt two metrics to characterize the
processor workload: time load and frequency load. In the
following, we present how to obtain these metrics and the
mobile OSes’ restrictions on accessing these metrics.
1) Time load: The synthetic file “/proc/stat” of the Android
OS and Android Things provides the accumulated and aggre-
gated core and processor times in the unit of ten milliseconds
spent for different types of processes (i.e., user, system, and
idle times, etc). Thus, by reading this file twice at the start
and end of a time duration, we can compute the percentage of
the processor time spent for the user apps. This percentage
is referred to the time load of the processor. Note that
the Android or Android Things apps can also invoke the
“top” utility to obtain the processor times. In fact, the “top”
utility also relies on the information contained in “/proc/stat”.
Reading “/proc/stat” suffices for sensing time load.
2) Frequency load: Most modern processors feature DVFS
that allows the processor clock rate to vary according to the
real-time compute load and/or the configurations specified via
Android’s CPU governor. DVFS is critical to extend the battery
lifetime of battery-based edge devices such as smartphones.
Due to DVFS, the processor clock rate is an indicator of the
processor workload. Although DVFS may have time delays in
reacting to the variations of processor workload, the delay will
not affect the information bit demodulation if the bit duration
is long enough.
The maximum, minimum, and real-time processor clock
rates can be obtained by reading the files with a prefix “scal-
ing ” in the “/sys/devices/system/cpu/cpui/cpufreq” directory,
where the i represents the index of the core. The user app
can read these files without any privileged permissions. For a
device with n cores, the frequency load is computed as:
frequency load =
1
n
n∑
i=1
current clock rate of the ith core
max clock rate of the ith core
.
Note that in this paper, we do not consider hyperthreading that
virtualizes a physical core into multiple virtual cores, since this
technique is not widely adopted for edge processors.
C. Processor Workload Control and Sensing
This section presents the details of implementing the pro-
cessor workload control and sensing for the modulation and
demodulation processes presented in Section III-C, under the
three attack scenarios.
1) Implementation for two Android apps: For processor
workload control, to achieve a high workload level used
by ASK or FSK, the transmitter app creates n − 2 threads
(where n is the number of cores) and uses repeated ma-
trix multiplications in each thread to increase the workload
as much as possible until the high workload level should
end. The rationale of using n − 2 cycle-exhausting threads
is as follows. As the Linux kernel tends to assign the
threads evenly to the processor cores, our approach will
most likely leave two cores not assigned with the cycle-
exhausting threads. Thus, these two remaining cores can
handle other compute tasks and retain the responsiveness of
the OS to the user’s input. Otherwise, the other compute
tasks may severely interfere with the modulation/demodulation
processes; the deteriorated system responsiveness to user’s
inputs can also reduce the stealthiness of the attack. Note that
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Fig. 3: The sensed workload traces of the first attack scenario
(two Android apps) on Phone-A. The x-axis is time in seconds;
the y-axis is the workload. The original data bits are ‘101010’.
A movie is played during transmission to create interference.
an Android app can obtain the value of n by using the API
java.lang.Runtime.availableProcessors().
For processor workload sensing, with Android prior to ver-
sion 8.0, the synthetic file “/proc/stat” can be read by user apps
without requiring any privileged permissions. Thus, the time
load-based demodulation can be implemented. However, with
Android version 8.0 and newer, the SELinux configuration
does not allow the user apps to access the synthetic file.
Thus, only the frequency load-based demodulation can be
implemented in Android 8.0 and newer.
Fig. 3 shows the sensed workload traces under various
combinations of modulation methods and processor workload
metrics on Phone-A. During the transmissions, a movie is
played to create interference. Although the waveforms are
different from the ideal waveforms, all the shown waveforms
can be correctly demodulated. From Fig. 3, we can also see
that the frequency load traces are less noisy than the time load
traces, due to the discrete nature of the frequency load.
2) Implementation for Android app and web app: We
use a JavaScript program that runs in a web browser in
the Android OS to control the processor workload, while a
native Android app as described in Section IV-C1 senses and
demodulates the processor workload. JavaScript was originally
designed as a single-threaded scripting language. The latest
JavaScript can use the Web Worker API of HTML5 to im-
plement multi-threaded concurrency. By using Web Worker,
we implement the modulation approach described in Sec-
tion IV-C1 by exhausting n − 2 cores. Note that JavaScript
can obtain the value of n by accessing the read-only property
navigator.hardwareConcurrency.
We also investigate whether the covert device association
threat is valid against the Tor browser [8]. Only the following
two features of the Tor browser affect our design. First, to
preserve the user’s location privacy, the Tor browser provides
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) only. Thus, the scheduled
rendezvous cannot be based on the local time and cannot
exploit the night time to increase the stealthiness of the
attack. Nevertheless, as the Tor browser unlikely runs in
the background unattended for long periods of time (e.g.,
days) due to the mobile user’s heightened caution in using
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
(a) Time load, ASK
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
(b) Frequency load, ASK
Fig. 4: The sensed workload traces of the second attack sce-
nario (Android app and Tor browser) on Phone-A. The x-axis
is time in seconds; the y-axis is the workload. Original data
bits are ‘101010’. A movie is played to create interference.
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Fig. 5: The sensed workload traces of the third attack scenario
(two Android Things 1.0 apps) on RPi. The x-axis is time in
seconds; the y-axis is the workload. Original data bits are
‘101010’. A large file is compressed to create interference.
anonymous communications, the opportunities for exploiting
unattended times for attack stealthiness are limited. From our
evaluation results in Section V, although the user activities
may degrade the performance of the covert device association,
the transmissions are still successful when the data rate is low.
Thus, this restriction of the Tor browser does not invalidate the
covert device association threat.
Second, as recent studies [28]–[30] show that the attackers
can leverage the 1-millisecond accurate timer of JavaScript to
de-anonymize the Tor browser, the Tor browser has reduced
the JavaScript timer’s resolution to 100 or 250 milliseconds
[31]. As the processor workload modulation requires the
JavaScript timer, the reduced timer resolution may lead to data
rate reduction of the covert communications. However, from
our evaluation results in Section V, the main bottleneck in
modulation is the response delay of processor workload to the
JavaScript program, rather than the reduced timer resolution.
Fig. 4 shows the sensed workload traces when an Android app
and a web page in Tor browser running on Phone-A perform
covert communications. A vertical dash line represents the
boundary between two bit periods. We can see that, under
ASK, there is a time delay of up to 0.5 seconds from when
the JavaScript intends to reduce the workload to when the
workload starts dropping. This is the aforementioned main
limiting factor for JavaScript to achieve high data rate.
3) Implementation for two Android Things 1.0 apps: Our
implementations for two Android 8.0 can be easily ported
to Android Things 1.0. Oriented to embedded edge devices,
the Android Things 1.0 does not prevent the user apps from
accessing the synthetic files storing run-time processor time
and frequency information as mentioned in Section IV-B.
Therefore, the receiver app can implement the demodula-
tion methods based on either time workload or frequency
workload. However, we find that the RPi’s processor mostly
7operates at its maximum clock rate of 1.2GHz among its two
available clock rates of 600MHz and 1.2GHz, even when
it is idle. This is because the RPi design is not optimized
for power conservation, rendering the frequency load-based
modulation/demodulation ineffective. Differently, the battery-
based smartphones actively scale down the clock rate to save
battery energy when the processor is idle or less busy. Thus,
in this paper, we only evaluate the time load-based scheme for
this attack scenario. Fig. 5 shows the sensed time load traces
when the two Android Things apps communicate. During
the transmissions, the RPi compresses a 300MB data file to
introduce interference. Both ASK and FSK work satisfactorily.
V. BENCKMARK EXPERIMENTS
We conduct experiments to benchmark our implementations
for the three attack scenarios. Section V-A presents the exper-
iment settings. Section V-B presents the benchmark results.
A. Experiment Settings and Methodology
We deploy our implementations to the three hardware setups
described in Section IV-A. For each covert transmission, the
transmitter generates a random sequence of 100 bits and then
applies ASK or FSK to modulate the processor workloads.
The receiver demodulates the sensed processor workload into
bits and computes BER based on ground truth. We vary the
bit duration T to achieve different data rate and use the
curve of BER versus data rate as the main covert commu-
nication performance profile. For each data rate setting, we
perform four transmissions and use an error bar to present
the minimum, maximum, and average BERs. We evaluate our
implementations in the absence and presence of interfering
computation. On the smartphones, we introduce the interfering
computation by movie playback. During the movie playback,
we also continuously create screen touch events to introduce
uncertainties. On the RPi loaded with Android Things 1.0, we
run a BASH script through the Android Debug Bridge (adb)
to repeatedly compress a 300MB file using gzip to introduce
interference. Note that this interference involves intensive
computing and massive I/O operations with the microSD card.
B. Benchmark Results
We present the three attack scenarios’ benchmark results.
1) Between two Android apps: We conduct experiments
using Phone-A. Fig. 6 shows the BER versus data rate under
various settings. We have the following three general observa-
tions. First, the BER increases with the data rate. Second, in
the presence of interfering computation, the BER-versus-data
rate curves become higher, because the interference causes bit
errors. Third, compared with ASK, FSK achieves much lower
data rates, because FSK uses multiple workload cycles to
represent a bit. In addition, we have the following observation
when we compare the subfigures of Fig. 6. The gaps between
the two curves in Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(d) are larger than those
in Fig. 6(b) and Fig. 6(c). This suggests that the demodulation
methods based on the combinations of 〈time load, FSK〉 and
〈frequency load,ASK〉 are more resilient to interference than
those based on 〈time load,ASK〉 and 〈frequency load, FSK〉.
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Fig. 6: BER vs. data rate on Phone-A. The subfigure captions
specify the used workload metric and modulation method.
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Fig. 7: BER vs. data rate on Phone-B.
Then, we investigate the heat generation during the covert
transmission process, since overheating may cause the mobile
user’s suspicion and investigation. In our experiments, we
record the smartphone’s battery temperature that can character-
ize the overall heat generation status of the smartphone. During
the experiments, the phone’s battery temperatures are around
35°C only, lower than the human body temperature. Therefore,
the covert transmission does not lead to salient overheating.
Lastly, we conduct experiments using Phone-B. A key
difference between Phone-A and Phone-B is that Phone-B is
equipped with two processors (i.e., ARM’s big.LITTLE archi-
tecture). The phone can dynamically switch between the two
processors depending on the real-time compute workload. This
introduces challenges to maintaining the processor workload
for modulation purpose. In addition, as Phone-B runs Android
8.0, it cannot measure the time load due to the OS’ restriction
as discussed in Section IV-C1. Fig. 7 shows the experiment
results on Phone-B, where the frequency load is used as the
processor workload metric. By comparing the results with
those shown in Figs. 6(c) and 6(d) for Phone-A, the covert
transmissions on Phone-B in general have higher BERs for
the same data rates. This degradation of covert communication
8TABLE I: Maximum achievable data rates in bps without any
bit errors in the absence and presence of interference.
Browser Google Chrome Tor browser
Setting
ASK, no interference
time load frequency load time load frequency load
Max bps 0.63 0.89 0.64 0.91
Setting
ASK, with interference
time load frequency load time load frequency load
Max bps 0.61 0.81 0.48 0.72
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
B
E
R
 (
%
)
Data rate (bps)
no interference
w/ interference
(a) Time load, ASK
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
 70
 80
 0  0.4  0.8  1.2  1.6
B
E
R
 (
%
)
Data rate (bps)
no interference
w/ interference
(b) Time load, FSK
Fig. 8: BER vs. data rate on RPi running Android Things 1.0.
performance is due to the extra uncertainty introduced by the
dynamic switching between the two processors. Nevertheless,
as long as the data rate is no greater than 0.25 bps, the
empirical BERs measured under the various settings are zero.
2) Between Android app and web app: We evaluate the
implementation presented in Section IV-C2 using both the
Google Chrome and the Tor browser on Phone-A. As shown in
Section IV-C2, the processor workload has delays in respond-
ing to the JavaScript program’s intent to change the processor’s
workload. This can be caused by the browser’s design for
controlling the JavaScript engine’s use of compute resources.
As such, when the bit duration is too short, the modulation
cannot be performed correctly. Table I shows the maximum
achievable data rates with zero empirical BER in the absence
and presence of interference. When the data rates are higher
than the values shown in Table I, the modulation cannot be
performed correctly. Moreover, the results shown in Table I
for the Google Chrome and the Tor browser are similar. The
results obtained in the absence and presence of interference
are also similar. These results suggest that the bottleneck
preventing from achieving higher data rates is the processor
workload’s delay in responding to the JavaScript program,
rather than the Tor browser’s reduced timer resolution and the
impact of interference.
3) Between two Android Things 1.0 apps: We evaluate
our implementation for two Android Things 1.0 apps running
on the RPi. As discussed in Section IV-C3, RPi’s limited
frequency scales and inactive DVFS render the frequency
load an ineffective processor workload metric. Thus, we only
evaluate the time load-based covert transmissions. Fig. 8 shows
the results. We can see that, in both subfigures, the gap
between the two curves corresponding to the presence and
absence of interference is small. This suggests that the covert
transmissions are resilient to the interference.
4) Summary: From the benchmark results obtained on the
three edge devices, the covert transmission via processor
workload can achieve a data rate of at least 0.25 bps with
zero empirical BER under the three attack scenarios, without
requiring any privileged permissions. If the app installation ID
is represented using six bytes, the covert device association can
be completed within 6× 8/0.25 seconds = 3.2minutes.
VI. DISCUSSION ON COUNTERMEASURES
As discussed in Section IV-C. Android 8.0 and newer have
restricted the access to the synthetic file containing processor
times. The latest Android (i.e., 10.0) still allows the access
to the synthetic file containing DVFS information. Thus, the
considered threat is valid on all current Android devices.
Security enhancements can impose permission requirement
for accessing the file containing DVFS information. However,
more advanced workload sensing technique can be developed.
For example, the receiver can measure the computation time
of a certain compute-intensive task to infer the processor
workload. As such, the receiver does not need to access any
synthetic file. A possible further defense can be reducing the
resolution of the timer APIs provided to apps. However, this
defense may affect the functionality of time-critical apps. In
summary, it is challenging to develop an ideal countermeasure
against the studied threat.
While the main purpose of this paper is to arouse the aware-
ness of the potential widespread covert device association
attack, we also would like to stress that effective countermea-
sures against the threat are still lacking now and important for
future work. The design of the countermeasures should well
balance various factors such as the defense effectiveness, the
compute overhead, the battery energy consumption on mobile
devices, the impact on the functionality of the apps, and etc.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated a minimal form of inter-
application covert communication called covert device associa-
tion in the context of edge computing systems. The considered
threat can widely spread and can be used as a stepping
stone to launch other attacks such as de-anonymization and
privilege escalation. It exploits a reliable and ubiquitous covert
channel based on the edge device’s processor workload. We
implemented three attack scenarios, i.e., the covert device as-
sociations between two Android apps, between an Android app
and a mobile web app, and between two Android Things 1.0
apps. Results show that the processor workload channel gives
at least 0.25 bps data rate and the covert device association
can be completed within 3.2 minutes.
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